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Justice Arthur J. Goldberg
By JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK*
It can be said without successful contradiction that we have been
blessed with no more versatile and useful American in the past half
century than Arthur J. Goldberg. He has excelled as a successful law-
yer, arbitrator, law professor, cabinet officer, Supreme Court Justice,
ambassador, diplomat-and most of all, as a concerned defender of
human rights everywhere.
Arthur Goldberg's service on the Supreme .Court-as it is perpetu-
ated in published volumes-is the most readily available aspect of his
work open to scrutiny. In my opinion, while his tenure on the Court
may have been brief in terms of chronological years, it was timeless in
the context of major contributions to constitutional law.
No jurist, before or since, has so persuasively called our attention
to the Ninth Amendment as did Justice Goldberg in his concurring
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.' With the pen of a historical
scholar, he traced the anatomy of that little noted amendment from the
conception of James Madison, through Justice Story, to its application
to the right of marital privacy.
- More significantly, he maintained that "the Ninth Amendment
shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights ex-
ist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and
an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive."'
That observation has proved to be perceptive and helpful in
achieving justice in innumerable areas. For example, the Constitution
does not guarantee a defendant a "fair trial," but only, in the Sixth
* Justice of the California Supreme Court.
1. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
2. Id at 492.
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Amendment, "the right to a speedy and public trial"'3 and in the Fifth
Amendment the right to "due process of law."4 Nevertheless, courts
have consistently required that, as a fundamental though unexpressed
right, every accused must receive a fair trial; it is unthinkable for it to
be otherwise.
In determining what rights are fundamental, judges cannot rely on
their personal whims or predilections. Rather, Justice Goldberg wrote
in Griswold, "they must look to the 'traditions and [collective] con-
science of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted
[there]. . .as to be ranked as fundamental.' "5 "The Uudicial] inquiry
is whether a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be
denied without violating those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"
, ",6
I find Griswold particularly significant also because Justice
Goldberg applied the Ninth Amendment and its implied guarantees of
fundamental rights not only to the federal government, but to the states
as well. Indeed, it was a state law of Connecticut that was invalidated
in that case.7 While agreeing with the Brandeis thesis that states may
act as social laboratories, he does "'not believe that this includes the
power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens
Justice Goldberg struck a major blow for the protection of a crimi-
nal accused's constitutional rights in the famous Escobedo case.9 Writ-
ing for a five-judge majority, he indicated a belief that prosecutions
begin long before a defendant is haled into court, indeed often at the
police station. Thus, while taking pains not to interfere with genuine
police investigation of crime, he declared that "when the process shifts
from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to
operate, and. . . the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer."
10
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. 381 U.S. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
6. Id (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Herbert v. Louisi-
ana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
7. Id. at 480 (construing CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)).
8. Id at 496 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, .,
concurring)).
9. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10. Id at 492.
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He cited at length Dean Wigmore's suspicion of any system of ad-
ministration that habitually depends upon compulsory self-disclosure
as a source of proof,"I and then declared:
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication
through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system
worth preserving should have tofear that if an accused is permit-
ted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exer-
cise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will
thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.'2
In Escobedo, Justice Goldberg referred to the duty of police to
effectively advise a defendant of his right to remain silent.'3 This duty
was later broadened by Chief Justice Warren to include the Miranda
admonitions and the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring im-
proper police conduct.'
4
InAguilar v. Texas,' 5 Justice Goldberg wrote the opinion for the
Court that explained the requirements for issuance of a search warrant
by state authorities. The issuing magistrate, he declared, must "per-
form his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rub-
ber stamp for the police."' 6 While some hearsay may be permitted in
affidavits for warrants, the instruments must contain affirmative allega-
tions based not on mere suspicion or belief, but on personal
knowledge-in short, the underlying circumstances from which the
magistrate may make his independent determination of whether to is-
sue the warrant. Aguilar retains vitality and is frequently cited in cur-
rent cases. 17  By contrast, he held an affidavit, if "read in a
commonsense way," to be sufficient in United States v. Ventresca.
18
The right to travel, even for a native-born communist, was upheld
by the Court in an opinion written by Justice Goldberg, 9 and such
11. 1d at 489 (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940)).
12. 378 U.S. at 490.
13. Id. at 491.
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
16. Id at 111.
17. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 n.8 (1981); In re De Monte, 674
F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir.
1981); People v. Fleming, 29 Cal. 3d 698,708, 631 P.2d 38,45, 175 Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1981);
People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 383, 618 P.2d 213, 217, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (1980)
(Newman, J., opinion of Court); id at 399, 618 P.2d at 227, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 681 (Bird, C.J.
dissenting).
18. 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1964).
19. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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right cannot be denied in the absence of due process. Indeed, he de-
clared that "freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related
to rights of free speech and association."2
Of course, Justice Goldberg's significant contributions to jurispru-
dence were not limited to majority opinions. I particularly like this
paragraph in his dissenting opinion in the maritime case of Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp. :
Stare decisis does not mean blind adherence to irrational doc-
trine. The very point of stare decisis is to produce a sense of se-
curity in the working of the legal system by requiring the
satisfaction of reasonable expectations. I should think that by al-
lowing a remedy where one is needed, by eliminating differences
not based on reason, while still leaving the underlying scheme of
duties unchanged, this sense of security will not be weakened butstrengthened. 2
I believe my favorite Goldberg opinion is his dissent in Swain v.
Alabama,22 in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined.
He deplored the use of peremptory challenges for the purposes of se-
lecting an all-white jury. He wrote, "Were it necessary to make an ab-
solute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice
of the former."
23
While his view did not prevail, thirteen years later I had the satis-
faction of writing People v. Wheeler.2 4 In that case, we expressly de-
clined to follow the Swain majority, and held that under the California
Constitution no litigant may exercise peremptory challenges in a ra-
cially discriminatory manner."
The purpose of this brief article is not to serve as a compendium of
Goldberg opinions. That would not be possible in the space allotted to
me. He wrote numerous challenging dissents, many with literary and
legal gems hidden within them. In the 1962 term he dissented nine
times, in the 1963 term seventeen times, in the 1964 term twelve times.
He was obviously most comfortable in the company of Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan,26 though he also dissented on occasion
20. Id at 517.
21. 379 U.S. 148, 166 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part).
22. 380 U.S. 202, 228 (1965) (Goldberg, Douglas, JJ., & Warren, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id at 244.
24. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
25. Id at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
26. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 581 (1965) (Goldberg, Black, JJ., &
Warren, C.J., dissenting); American Ship Bldg. v. Labor Bd., 380 U.S. 300, 327 (1965)
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with Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart, and Harlan.27
My desire here is to pay tribute to Arthur J. Goldberg, a discern-
ing legal mind, a distinguished American, but more importantly, a
warm, compassionate human being. It has been my pleasure to have
known him vicariously since World War II-he and my brother served
together, at times in some dangerous missions. It has been my good
fortune to have known him personally and intimately since the days of
the Kennedy administration. He has been a good friend, a delight to
dine with, to talk to, to listen to, and even occasionally to argue with.
Arthur Goldberg has contributed much to the well-being of our
country. And he is continuing to do so.
(Goldberg, J., & Warren, C.J., concurring in the result); Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,
363 (1964) (Goldberg, J., & Warren, C.J., joining opinion of Brennan, J., and holding of the
Court); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964) (Goldberg & Brennan, JJ., mem.).
27. See, e.g., Paragon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 639 (1965) (Goldberg &
Black, JJ., dissenting); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 228 (1965) (Warren, C.J., Goldberg
& Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 43 (1965) (Goldberg,
Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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